There was generally great public interest in crim con actions, with high courtroom attendance 11 sometimes regulated by ticket, 12 and detailed newspaper reports. 13 However, despite the attention they attracted, they were in fact relatively rare. Crim con cases peaked in England around the 1790s in the midst of a moral panic. 14 Ireland may have lagged behind by a couple of decades in this regard; while in 1804 crim con actions were described as 'novel', 15 a lawyer in 1816 lamented that crim con actions had become 'so flagrant, and the crime so grown, to the total disregard of conjugal rights and state'. 16 In 1818 another lawyer remarked on the frequency of such cases 17 and in 1820 Lord Norbury said that adultery 'was a crime extensively growing to magnitude and depravity in this country.' 18 These statements about the apparent increase in crim con actions may have been linked to a generalized moral panic associated with the mass exodus of nobility and gentry in the decades following the Act of Union. 19 By the end of the decade, however, a lawyer remarked that it was 'most creditable to this country to find that actions of this nature were exceedingly rare', 20 suggesting either a decline in the number of cases or simply a decline in the perceived frequency of such cases. The rest of the nineteenth was punctuated by statements about the rarity of crim con 11 Anon (1835 13 Jurors were often warned to disregard any rumours or speculation that they had heard regarding the case: Anon (1804 actions. 21 The moral purity of the Irish, and Irish women in particular, 22 was a popular theme from the mid-nineteenth century onward; 23 although as Inglis points out, ' [t]he notion that Ireland was a country of virtuous virgins, chaste mothers, and abstemious fathers was mythical.' 24 Nevertheless, it was remarked in 1859 for example that Ireland 'was celebrated not only for the chastity and purity of its women, but also for the honour of its men. It was seldom indeed that [a crim con] action was brought under the notice of the public.' 25 Perceptions of the frequency with which crim con actions came before the court may have depended on whether a particular case occurred in the context of a wider moral panic, and whether the circumstances of a particular case attracted much attention. Later cases involving middle-class parties and modest damages may have attracted less notice. 26
The Rationale for Crim Con Damages
Crim con could be pleaded either as an action in trespass 27 (on the husband's rights in relation to his wife 28 ) or on the case. 29 Case was a form of action which developed out of trespass, but allowed for damages for less immediate and direct injuries. 30 30 William Blackstone (1800) Commentaries on the Laws of England vol 3 (13 th edn, London: A Strahan), p 122, describes trespass on the case as a 'universal remedy' for 'wrongs unaccompanied by force'. It also allowed for compensation in cases where the injury was caused by omission, or where it was not immediately injurious. The actions of seducing a wife away plead crim con on the case, because the injury was 'not immediate, but consequential', and because it made it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to specify exactly when and where the incident (or incidents) of adultery had occurred. 31 As well as providing compensation to the husband for the infringement of his rights, McCardie J. in the English case of Butterworth v Butterworth suggested a more 'cogent moral foundation' for the action:
The law has ever regarded the sanctity of married life as a matter of grave moment. It may be, therefore, that one of the original objects of the action was to maintain the purity of married life, and to defend the honour of husband, wife and children. The risk of damages might well have been deemed a check to the wanton inclinations of an intending adulterer. 32 Under this interpretation, crim con not only served to vindicate the husband's rights, but could also to deter potential adulterers 33 and uphold the sanctity of marriage. However, this moral rationale for crim con was not fully developed until the Victorian period; earlier crim con cases were more concerned with compensation and loss of honour.
It is clear from an examination of some 80 Irish cases and general statements of the law in England and Ireland that the purpose of crim con damages changed over time. Much of the early focus was on the exemplary or punitive nature of the damages: for example, Blackstone wrote that adultery with another man's wife was the greatest civil injury recognized by law, and 'the damages recovered [ Leonard 41 holding that the jury ought to be guided solely by the injury to the plaintiff, and not the punishment of the defendant. The value of the defendant's property in this case was withheld from the jury, because it was deemed irrelevant to their calculation of damages, bringing Irish jurisprudence into line with a number of English decisions. 42 Aside from occasional instances where juries appeared to award punitive damages 43 the focus on compensation remained well into the twentieth century. In 1974 the Supreme Court confirmed that damages ought to be restricted to what could be considered compensatory in respect of the loss suffered, 44 and in 1979 a jury was warned that 'there should not be any element of punishment of either side.' 45 The Nature of Crim Con Actions
The nature of crim con in Ireland changed over time. As in England, crim con cases were originally the preserve of the wealthy elite, and in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries actions tended to be brought by wealthy or aristocratic men. 46 The 1816 case of Binns v Scott was even described by counsel as 'novel' because the parties were 'not in high life.' 47 However, from the second half of the nineteenth century we see crim con actions increasingly being taken by men of more modest means such as, for example, a stationmaster, 48 a coal merchant, 49 a mill-worker, 50 a gardener, 51 a farmer, 52 a chemical manufacturer 53 a clerk 54 a teacher 55 and a doctor in a lunatic asylum. 56 The damages sought in such cases were generally much lower than would have been the case in the aristocratic cases of a century before. 57 The cases that came before the Irish courts involved Roman Catholics, 58 members of the Church of Ireland 59 and other denominations. 60 It was rare for crim con to be taken in response to an alleged rape or sexual assault. 61 The fairly typical scenario was a wife having an adulterous affair with a close friend or acquaintance of her husband, or sometimes with her employer. 62 Inglis observes that the history of Irish sexuality 'remains a relatively hidden, secretive area'; 63 some crim con cases were more unusual and reveal a hidden world of sexual activity. For example, there was the 'well-reared' daughter of a Presbyterian Minister, married to a newspaper publisher, who ended up repeatedly having drunken liaisons with numerous bank employees in the lanes and alleys of Ballina. 64 There was the upper middle-class husband who cheerfully prostituted his wife and boasted about it. 65 There was also the woman admitted to a private asylum where sexual relations freely took place between patients, staff, visitors and prostitutes, and who became pregnant, probably by one of the doctors. 66 These sorts of cases belie the myth that there was no extramarital sexual activity in Ireland.
Crim con actions might be taken out of revenge, as part of wider marriage breakdown proceedings, 67 or simply to extort money, as in Devlin v Davy. 68 The plaintiff, an alcoholic gardener, had been imprisoned several times for assaulting his wife, who had obtained a divorce on grounds of cruelty. He brought a crim con action against Dr Davy, but both his daughter and his daughter-in-law testified that he had offered them money to give false testimony against the defendant. The daughter described her father as a 'villain and a ruffian', and told the court that her mother had financially supported the family for years. The jury unsurprisingly returned a verdict for the defendant, and the judge was particularly critical of the plaintiff, making an order that the Crown Solicitor should institute criminal proceedings against him for perjury. Matthews v Moniali 69 was probably an attempt to extort money from a married Church of Ireland clergyman who had recently fired his steward, the plaintiff. There were numerous examples of cases which did not appear to be bona fide, 70 or which may have involved a conspiracy against the defendant. 71 Sometimes the crim con action might have been viewed by the plaintiff as the solution to his desperate financial troubles, especially if he owed money to the defendant. 72 In Murdock v Rynn 73 the wife testified that her husband suggested that she ought to be 'found' in some 'awkward places with Mr Rynne', with whom she was on friendly terms, and that he would share with her any money recovered from him. 74
Proving Criminal Conversation
67 By the late eighteenth century, a crim con action was part of the slow, expensive process of obtaining a parliamentary divorce. See Diane Urquhart (2013) Irish crim con cases were usually tried by special juries, 75 who determined whether adultery had been proven, 76 and if so, the quantum of damages to be awarded. These were cases 'wherein juries are permitted to exercise a degree of discretion not common in other cases, and wherein they are entire judges of facts.' 77 Nevertheless, either party could apply for a verdict to be set aside on the basis that it went against the weight of evidence, and that it was a verdict that no reasonable jury could have reached. 78 A number of facts had to be proven before a jury awarded damages. First, it had to be established that the plaintiff and his wife had in fact been married. 79 Production of a marriage register was unnecessary; usually the testimony of the clergyman who had performed the marriage ceremony sufficed. It was unnecessary to prove that the defendant knew that the woman was married. 80 The plaintiff then had to prove adultery between his wife and the defendant. Given the nature of the act, most cases involved circumstantial evidence, often from servants. 81 This might include details of extended or nocturnal visits, secret letters, 82 whispered conversations, secretly commissioned portraits or the discovery of keepsakes, 83 closed 84 75 However, crim con cases which were tried at assizes were more likely to go before a common jury: Dunlop v Johnson, Belfast Newsletter, 22 Jul 1886 and Cronin v Murphy, Belfast Newsletter, 17 May 1897. The latter was subsequently retried by a special jury. 76 Unless the defendant had allowed judgment against him by default, in which case the jury's role was merely to assess damages. 77 80 In Worrall v Snow, Belfast Newsletter, 12 Aug 1874, Mrs Worrall had concealed the fact that she was married, yet her husband still recovered damages. Chitty (1844) Treatise on Pleading, p 484, pointed out that it was unnecessary in such cases to allege or prove that the defendant knew that the woman was married, but that such knowledge was necessary in cases of seducing or harbouring a wife or servant. 81 According to Kisbey (1871) Law and Practice, p 7, where there was no direct evidence of adultery, 'the circumstances must be such as would lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to the conclusion. ' or locked 85 drawing-room doors, clothing torn, stained or in disarray, 86 beds that appeared to have been slept in by two persons, 87 and so on. 88 Servants might become suspicious if they were sent out of the house on apparently frivolous errands. 89 Sometimes the husband discovered his wife and her lover together. In McCraith v Quinn, 90 for example, the suspicious husband had followed his wife when she went out riding, and discovered her on a side-road conversing with the defendant, who had already been barred from their house. The enraged husband 'beat him with a stick, which he broke across his back.' 91 Events were even more dramatic in Conyers v Westropp, 92 where Mr Conyers burst into his wife's room with the aid of a few servants, and found the couple in flagrante. Westropp, a magistrate, jumped out of the bed in his shirt and 'a struggle ensued; Mrs Conyers interposed, endeavouring to screen her seducer from the vengeance of her husband; and she too was undressed.' Westropp fired a pistol, and received a severe beating at the hands of Conyers' servants, suffering a fractured skull and numerous lacerations from pitchforks. He was thrown out into the yard, covered with blood, whereupon Mrs Conyers flung herself over him, dressed only in a chemise, so that they would not kill him. One of the more sensational cases involving directly witnessed intercourse was Joynt v Jackson, 93 where several witnesses testified to having seen Mrs Joynt engaging in 'immoral acts' with around eight different men in Ballina.
It was not enough simply to show that the plaintiff had been married and that adultery had taken place between his wife and the defendant. An actual loss to the plaintiff had to be proven, especially if crim con was 85 In Anon (1807) The Trial of J. Hacket, Esquire, for Adultery with Mrs Mansergh. In the Irish Court of Exchequer on Dec the 10th, 1807 (London: J. Day), the maid had grown suspicious because her mistress was in the habit of locking the doors when Mr Hacket called, so she 'spoiled all the locks, so that they could not secure the doors'. She then burst into the drawingroom where they were 'and caught them both upon the carpet', p 6. 86 pleaded as an action on the case. 94 This loss had to be shown to be caused by the defendant's acts. 95 So for example, in Joynt v Jackson, Mrs Joynt had had adulterous affairs with a number of men, including her brother-in-law, but Jackson, as her first seducer, had been the initial cause of the plaintiff's loss.
The wife's voice was not heard in late eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century crim con cases. The action lay between her husband and her alleged lover; a wife could neither testify nor have witnesses to testify on her behalf. She might have her reputation destroyed in court 96 without being afforded a right of reply. She was 'not regularly before the court, though more deeply involved in the event than either of the others; who has no advocate … to plead her cause, or to defend her from obloquy, from infamy, from destruction'. 97 Sir George Bowyer, MP for Dundalk, remarked in 1854 that … although the wife was upon her trial, and its issue might involve her utter ruin and destruction, she had no part in the proceeding. She was not heard at all … The most abominable charges might be brought against her by witnesses in the action, and enforced by all the eloquence and ingenuity of counsel; she might thus be held up to the world as a being utterly degraded; yet she was neither allowed to produce a single witness, nor to say a single word, either in vindication of her innocence or in mitigation of the imputed guilt. 98 His proposed bill 99 sought to allow wives in crim con cases to testify, but was defeated. 100 However, the Evidence Further Amendment Act 1869 101 94 As will be discussed below, this hinged on demonstrating the wife's high worth, the husband's happiness during the marriage and his misery upon discovering the adultery. 95 100 It also proposed the replacement of damages with a court-imposed fine, thus preventing a husband from benefitting materially from his wife's adultery. provided that '[t]he parties to any proceeding instituted in consequence of adultery, and the husbands and wives of such parties, shall be competent to give evidence in such proceeding'. As a consequence, by the late nineteenth century it was increasingly common for wives (and indeed husbands 102 ) to take the stand and testify either that adultery had not taken place, 103 or admit that it took place but with the husband's full knowledge. 104 
How Were Damages Assessed?
Staves points out that crim con actions raised interesting questions about the meaning of money, the relationship between money and class, the expectations of the rights and responsibilities within marriage; of whether or not wives may be considered the property of their husbands; or more generally, of whether there is any such thing as property in persons. 105 In assessing damages, juries had to take account of several factors, 'the relative weight attached to each of which changed over time'. 106 In the late eighteenth century, the emphasis was on the plaintiff's loss of honour, especially if there was the possibility of illegitimate offspring. 107 From around 1750 the primary concern became the plaintiff's loss of his wife's comfort and society. During this period, the size of the damages depended on how happy the couple had been before the alleged affair. 108 This is reflected in a statement from Buller in 1817:
As to adultery the action lies for the injury done to the husband in alienating his wife's affection, destroying the comfort he had from her company and raising children for him to support and provide for. And as the injury is great so the damages given are commonly very considerable. But they are properly increased or diminished by the particular circumstances of each case; the rank and quality of the plaintiff, the condition of the defendant, his being a friend, relation, or dependent of the plaintiff or being a man of substance, proof of the plaintiff and his wife having lived comfortably together before her acquaintance with the defendant and her having always borne a good character till then, and proof of a settlement or provision for the children of the marriage, are all proper circumstances of aggravation. 109 A similar description of how to assess crim con damages was given in the English case of Butterworth 110 and later approved and summarized O'Higgins CJ in Maher v Collins:
In awarding compensatory damages, regard should be had to (a) the actual value of the wife to the husband, and (b) the proper compensation to the husband for the injury to his feelings, the blow to his marital honour and the hurt to his matrimonial and family life. 111 The various aspects of this will be examined in turn. The assessment of the actual value of the wife to the husband had both consortium and pecuniary aspects. The latter was straightforward, and involved the plaintiff demonstrating the loss of his wife's services; for example, the neglect of him, their children 112 or her household duties. 113 It was claimed in Patterson v Pullen 114 that after the wife had intercourse with the defendant, 'her sobriety no longer remained, her strict attention, her economy and attention to her husband's interests were sacrificed to an indulgence in infidelity, to a waste of his property, and to disgust of his person!' 115 By the nineteenth century, the main premise of the action was founded upon the husband's loss of his wife's society; so he generally had no standing if he had been separated from his wife at the time of the alleged adultery. 116 The plaintiff also had to establish his wife's high worth in terms of her physical attributes, sweet temperament, helpfulness and so on. Thus the wives in these cases were almost invariably portrayed as beautiful, charming and engaging. Mrs Brown was 'a person of considerable personal beauty'; 117 Mrs Conyers was 'a lady of extraordinary beauty'; 118 Mrs Hurst was 'young and good-looking'; 119 while Mrs Taafe was 'the charm of every circle -gay, young, playful, lovely and innocent.' 120 As the solicitor general explained in Mansergh v Hacket, '[i]n cases of this nature, the lady is ... represented, in order to engage your sympathy, as a paragon of virtue, an angel of light before your fall' 121 This fitted with the wider Victorian narrative of the married woman as passive, virtuous, dedicated 'household angels'. 122 Some wives were also portrayed as passive victims, falling prey to predatory men, who pursued them relentlessly until finally the wife succumbed. 123 As Binhammer observes, '[t]he question of the wife's passive or active sexual nature [became] the pivotal issue' in these trials. 124 As for the husband's loss of consortium, crim con damages are one of the earliest examples of damages being awarded for emotional pain and suffering. 125 Staves describes the eighteenth-century law as 'reflecting the more general cultural awareness of such psychological intangibles.' 126 The plaintiff sought to maximize his damages by proving that he and his wife had lived in matrimonial harmony and domestic bliss before the defendant intervened. As Lord Norbury said in Nugent v Norie, 127 if the husband could not show that he had lost 'connubial happiness', his claim must fail. 128 Friends and acquaintances would describe the marriage as happy and mutually satisfactory. 129 
The Husband's Injured Feelings and Damaged Honour.
The plaintiff was presented as heartbroken, outraged and humiliated. Evidence would be adduced as to his despair, and his signaling disapproval of the adultery by refusing to live with his wife thereafter. 130 In determining the injury to the plaintiff's feelings and his loss of honour, jurors took account of various aggravating and mitigating factors. Blackstone wrote in 1797 that damages were properly increased and diminished by circumstances; as the rank and fortune of the plaintiff and defendant; the relation or connection between them; the seduction or otherwise of the wife, founded on her previous behavior and character; and the husband's obligation by settlement or otherwise to provide for those children, which he cannot but suspect to be spurious. 131 The husband's injury could be exacerbated by the defendant's conduct. Enticing the wife away or harbouring her after the adultery 132 could be aggravate damages, as could his close friendship with the plaintiff: in McCraith v Quinn, 133 damages of £5,000 were awarded where the defendant was the plaintiff's close friend, first cousin, and best man. 134 Other circumstances could further aggravate the injury to the plaintiff and, consequentially, the damages to which he was entitled. In Massy v Headford, the plaintiff was a Church of Ireland minister, and his counsel placed much emphasis on the timing of the act of adultery:
The day was Sunday, the hour the time of Divine Service; yes gentlemen, on that day, and on that hour, set apart for the service of our Creator, whilst the Reverend Rector was bending before the altar of his God … upon such an occasion did the noble lord think proper to commit this honourable breach of hospitable faith. 135 In Fay v Barber the judge spoke of the 'wanton lewdness' of the defendant, 'to keep a whore at the husband's expense, and make him pay for that which he does not enjoy'. 136 On the other hand, the defendant's age and marital status were both relevant factors, 137 a mitigating factor might be, for example, 'evidence that the Defendant was a giddy boy, unsettled in his principles, and seduced to gratify the lewdness of a wanton woman'. 138 The general conduct and character of the wife almost invariably came under scrutiny in crim con actions. Binhammer argues that 'what is on trial in crim con actions is not the individual guilt or innocence of the men involved but the sexuality of the new domestic woman.' 139 In 1854, Bowyer observed that if the wife's 'previous character were bad, the injury to the husband would be less. Thus, it was the interest of the defendant to run down the character of the woman in order to diminish the amount of damages.' 140 There are many examples of defendants portraying their lovers as wanton, lascivious, of defective character and loose morals. 141 In Cloncurry v Piers, for example, much was made of the fact that Lady Cloncurry had allegedly committed adultery with Piers the first time they found themselves alone. The implication was that she was not 'a modest woman, bred up in religious habit, of a retired disposition', and this greatly reduced her value. 142 The Chief Justice described it as 'a conquest of no great difficulty … The conquest was so easy... That her value could not be highly estimated.' 143 The jury found for the plaintiff, and while the damages awarded were high, at £20,000, this was only one-fifth of the £100,000 sought, suggesting that while they were convinced that the adultery had taken place, they considered Lady Cloncurry to be devalued for the reasons outlined. In Blachford v Latouche 144 the wife was in her thirties, had been married some 14 years, and was portrayed as having flung herself upon the relatively young, innocent defendant. Counsel for Latouche asked the jury what loss has the plaintiff sustained in being deprived of the society of a woman who, herself advanced in years, with a perfect knowledge of the world, after a few weeks acquaintance with a mere boy, would, in defiance of the honour of her sex, and of her sacred duty as a wife, have been guilty of such a crime? Again, the jury awarded one-fifth of the damages sought. A defendant might also disparage his lover's physical attributes; Mrs Binns was variously described by the defendant's witnesses as 'middle aged... lusty' 'not very handsome … a large corpulent woman'. 145 Even up to the late twentieth century, a defence strategy appeared to be to portray the wife as being of low worth. Counsel for the plaintiff, in cross-examining the defendant in Mulvaney v Collins, asked 'are you asking the jury to say she is a worthless slut who is worth nothing to a decent married man?' 146 The defendant did not answer, but later agreed that she was a completely worthless woman.
The husband's conduct was also scrutinized, and he could expect to have his damages reduced 147 if he was abusive 148 or unfaithful. In Patterson v Pullen 149 Lord Kilwarden observed that that although the plaintiff's abuse of Mrs Patterson did not disentitle him to damages, it would 'disqualify him from heavy damages', and he was awarded just sixpence. If the husband were known to have had adulterous affairs of his own, this might also reduce his damages, for two reasons: first, because evidence of his unfaithfulness negated arguments of matrimonial happiness before the wife's seduction, and secondly, 'because such dissipation and neglect is likely to set a bad example to the woman: it tends to sap her morals, to estrange her affections, and facilitate her seduction.' 150 In Glerawley v Burn, 151 defence counsel argued that Glerawley's extended absences from home had left his wife 'exposed to the shoals of seduction,' and relatively low damages were awarded. If connivance by the husband could be proven, this defeated the action altogether. In many cases, however, connivance was difficult to prove, and juries merely awarded low damages if they were 145 Binns v Scott (1816), pp 10, 16. 146 Irish Times, 10 Nov 1979. 147 Kisbey (1871) Law and Practice, p 17. 148 In Fay v Barber (1797) there was evidence that the husband was abusive towards his wife, and on one occasion he had locked her in a closet for nineteen days without a fire or adequate food. He recovered £1,000 damages. The jury may have been of the view that his treatment of his wife on that occasion was somewhat justified, as he had acted out of jealousy and suspicion of the defendant. 149 Freeman's Journal, 2 Dec 1800. 150 Massy v Headfort (1804), p 91. 151 Belfast Newsletter, 4 June 1820. Note that this was an action involving the Irish peer, Viscount Glerawley, which was tried in the English Court of King's Bench.
suspicious. For example, in Geoghegan Nowlan v Glentworth, 152 both parties were imprisoned in the Dublin Marshalsea for debt. They became friends and the Mrs Nowlan became Viscount Glentworth's mistress, with her husband's knowledge. Although connivance was not definitively proven, the jury, no doubt suspicious, awarded only 40 shillings in damages. 153 The plaintiff's conduct in relation to his wife came under close scrutiny in the case Hodgens v Mahon. 154 Miss Walker had been made a ward of Chancery as a child, and was abducted from her boarding school by Hodgens at the age of thirteen. He was arrested and imprisoned, but after petitioning the Lord Chancellor he was released on recognizances of 20,000 pounds that he would not go near Miss Walker again. However, he could not resist; he kidnapped her a second time, fleeing to the continent where they lived as man and wife for several years, having been married by a 'degraded clergyman'. 155 When she came of age and they returned to Ireland and Hodgens presented her to the Lord Chancellor, asking whether or not it would be in her best interests to be officially married to him now that she was free to choose. The inevitable conclusion was that because she had been living with Hodgens as his wife for the past six years, it was unlikely that anyone else would now want her, and her reputation would be ruined if they were not married. This, according to the Chief Baron was to be considered by the jury as a factor likely to diminish any award of damages: 'If a man comes to seek damages for a lost property it is fair for the jury to say to him "did you come honestly by that property." Similarly, he should be able to show 'how he became possessed of that wife.' 156 The judge (and, unsurprisingly, counsel for the defendant) was very critical of Hodgens' actions, asking '...if he did use the privilege of a husband upon the person of that infant, how dare he come into this court seeking for the compensation of your verdict.' 157 The jury in that case awarded the plaintiff a paltry £200 in damages; a small fraction of the £10,000 sought.
Finally, the existence of children often presented itself as an aggravating factor. The adulterous wife had not only betrayed her husband 152 Freeman's Journal, 10 Jul 1822. 153 In Taafe v Fitzgerald, the defendant admitted his guilt and suggested connivance by the plaintiff. This was not proven, but the jury awarded only a quarter of the damages sought. 154 but had also abandoned her children, who, it was claimed, had to live with their mother's infamy. In one case it was said that adultery 'makes the children hated of the parent, and daughters travel through life, reproached with the vileness of their mother.' 158 Losing the wife's care of the children could also contribute to the husband's pecuniary loss, especially if the family were large. 159 Children born after the adultery took place obviously raised questions about their paternity, and the husband might find himself obliged to financially support his rival's child. For example, in Cloncurry v Piers, Lady Cloncurry gave birth to a son, presumed to be fathered by Piers, and the solicitor general pointed out that this boy stood to inherit some of Lord Cloncurry's estate. 160 
Conclusions
By the time of the passing of the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, there was a growing body of opinion that, for various reasons, the 'ancient, but not venerable' 161 action of crim con ought to be abolished. Staves argues that on one hand the action seemed medieval as it depended upon the notion of a wife as property, yet, on the other hand, it 'seems to represent a degree of progress over the earlier resort to private violence'. 162 However, by the nineteenth century, '[i]ncreasingly, accepting money for one's wife's adultery became morally repulsive. How could a financial sum ever recompense a man for the loss of domestic felicity?' 163 Some viewed the payment of damages by a woman's lover to her husband as effectively allowing husbands to prostitute their wives. The law of the United Kingdom was seen as being increasingly out of step with the rest of Europe. Damages were difficult to assess, and there appeared to be a lack of consensus as to whether they were to be merely compensatory or also exemplary. Binhammer also argues that the moral foundation of crim con actions was 'eventually eroded by the ideal of companionate marriage'. 164 There was also increasing recognition of the potential unfairness of such actions to women:
As time went on, more and more thoughtful men and women began to realize that in a crim con suit a wife could be falsely charged by a husband anxious only to be rid of her, or falsely blamed for enticement, or falsely accused of previous promiscuity by a lover anxious to mitigate the damages against him. 165 Despite these various problems with crim con, its abolition in England was not followed in Ireland. It not only existed but evolved over the following century until its eventual abolition by section 1 of the Family Law Act 1981. 166 From the mid-nineteenth century onwards there was something of a democratization of crim con actions. No longer the exclusive preserve of the wealthy elite, lower middle-class and working-class men increasingly viewed the action as being open to them. The cases reported in the newspapers around the turn of the twentieth century lacked much of the glamour associated with cases from a century earlier, and damages awarded were more modest. By the twentieth century crim con had less to do with financially compensating the husband for the loss of his wife, 167 and more to do with public enforcement of private morals. 164 'The Sex Panic of the 1790s', p 429. 165 Stone (1990) 'Honour, Morals, Religion', p 300. 166 The Law Reform Commission had proposed the abolition of criminal conversation in its First Report on Family Law, 1980 (LRC 1-1980). The twentieth century history of crim con and its ultimate decline has been dealt with thoroughly by Diane Urquhart, who charts the role of feminist groupings in campaigning for crim con's abolition in Diane Urquhart (2012) 'Ireland's Criminal Conversations' Études Irlandaises, 37(2), 65-80. 167 Notwithstanding the comments of Butler J in Braun v Roche to the effect that a wife was 'something that the husband owned', and that he ought to be compensated for her loss 'just as you would compensate him for a thoroughbred mare or cow.' Irish Times, 22 June 1972.
